

















































The	 Left	 realist	 project	 in	 criminology	 was	 initiated	 in	 the	 1980s	 with	 the	 central	 aim	 of	
developing	 a	 social	 democratic	 approach	 to	 crime	 (see	 Taylor	 1981	 for	 an	 early	 Left	 realist	




specific	 issues	 and	 less	 on	 the	 original	 idea	 of	 developing	 a	 wide‐ranging,	 social	 democratic	
crime	 agenda	 (DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 2010,	 2012;	 Lea	 2002;	 Walklate	 2015).	 The	





that	 crime	 had	 become	 newly	 politicised,	 a	 vital	 electoral	 battleground	 and	 an	 important	
ingredient	in	hegemonic	political	strategy.	Nothing	has	changed	in	this	regard,	but	adopting	this	
perspective	suggests	–	as	 I	will	argue	 in	 the	 first	half	of	 the	paper	–	 that	 the	past	history	and	
present	 role	 of	 the	 Left	 realist	 project	must	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 context	 of	 shifts	 across	 the	
broader	 political	 landscape	 over	 the	 last	 30	 years,	 the	 rise	 of	 neo‐liberalism,	 the	 impact	 of	
populism	 (in	 penal	 politics	 and	politics	 at	 large),	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 Left	 and	 the	prospects	 of	
social	democratic	renewal	in	the	wake	of	the	global	financial	crisis	(GFC)	and	the	contemporary	
outpouring	of	popular	protest	around	the	world.	I	take	the	view	that	Left	Realism	must	work	in	




Hope	 and	 fear:	 The	 paradox	 of	 neo‐liberalism	 and	 the	 failures	 of	 social	 democratic	
politics		
In	the	years	immediately	following	Margaret	Thatcher’s	victory	in	the	1979	general	election	in	







as	 the	 new	 political	 orthodoxy	 in	 many	 parts	 of	 the	 world.	 The	 public	 issues	 that	 animated	
politics	 in	the	1960s	and	1970s	–	poverty,	 inequality,	re‐distribution,	social	rights,	combatting	
corporate	power	–	were	buried	behind	the	promise	of	personal	 freedom,	enlarged	choice	and	
widespread	 prosperity,	 courtesy	 of	 ‘the	 market’.	 Criminologists	 with	 progressive	 political	
leanings	continued	to	engage	with	the	theoretical,	research	and	policy	issues	of	the	day,	but	Left	
Realism	not	surprisingly	lost	some	of	its	political	bearings.	Its	prospects	of	revival	as	a	political	
project	 are	 entwined	 with	 the	 more	 general	 revival	 of	 social	 democratic	 politics	 –	 a	 wider	















insecurities	 and	 instability	 the	 latter	 so	 deftly	 exploits.	 If	 street	 crime	 in	 the	 70s	 could	 be	
successfully	 pinned	 by	 the	 Right	 on	 the	 supposed	 moral	 flabbiness	 and	 permissive	 social	
policies	 associated	 with	 the	 welfare	 state,	 then	 the	 great	 waves	 of	 financial	 crime	 and	 near	
collapse	of	the	global	economy	in	the	GFC	should,	one	would	think,	have	been	able	to	be	sheeted	
home	 to	 the	 greed,	 licence	 and	 amoral	 personal	 and	 corporate	 behaviour	 unleashed	 by	 the	
Right’s	deregulatory	policies	and	free	market	ideology.	It	was	Thatcher	and	Reagan	that	lit	the	
fuse	 that	 blew	 up	 the	 global	 economy	 in	 2008,	with	 dire	 social	 consequences	 for	millions	 of	
people	who	lost	their	homes,	their	jobs	and	their	savings.	Pervasive	criminality	in	the	financial	
sector	was	an	undeniable	fact	contributing	to	the	crisis.	Yet	not	only	were	there	no	significant	
criminal	prosecutions,	neo‐liberal	dominance	has	remained	 largely	unshaken	 in	 the	aftermath	
(Ferguson	2012;	Hogg	2013b).	 The	many	 lessons	of	 the	GFC	 are	 yet	 to	be	 fully	digested.	 The	





also	 reduced	 them	 to	 practising	 a	mostly	managerial	 or	 technocratic	 politics	 from	which	 the	












issue,	 many	 of	 their	 policies	 remain	 unpopular	 and	 are	 a	 source	 of	 widespread	 disaffection.	
Governments	of	both	the	Right	and	the	Centre	Left	have	often	imposed	policies	(on,	for	example,	
privatisation,	 corporatisation	 of	 education	 and	 health	 services,	 and	 stripping	 support	 for	 the	
poor)	 that	 are	 not	 popular,	 but	 political	 convergence	 has	 left	 voters	 with	 little	 real	 choice.	
Nonetheless,	 strong	 public	 feeling	 still	 imposed	 limits	 on	 neo‐liberal	 ambitions.	 Many	 of	 the	
social	democratic	reforms	of	the	60s	and	70s	–	those	of	Labor/Labour	governments	in	Australia	
and	 Britain	 and	 Johnson’s	 ‘Great	 Society’	 programmes	 –	 survived	 the	 neo‐liberal	 assault:	
environmental	 regulation,	 consumer	 protection	 laws,	 work	 and	 product	 safety	 laws,	 anti‐
discrimination	laws,	and	the	repeal	of	overtly	racist	immigration	laws,	to	name	a	few.	They	are	
now	too	entrenched	 to	be	wound	back	or	even	 to	be	 recognised	and	celebrated	as	significant	
social	democratic	reforms.		
	
The	neo‐liberal	marketisation	of	so	many	other	areas	of	everyday	 life,	 including	politics	 itself,	
and	 the	 corruption,	 insecurities	 and	 cynicism	 it	 has	 brought	 in	 its	 wake	 has	 fed	 a	 growing	
disaffection	with	conventional	politics	and	declining	trust	 in	public	 institutions	(Coggan	2013;	
Hay	 2007;	 Marquand	 2015).	 This	 is	 where	 neo‐liberalism	 in	 economic	 and	 social	 policy	
connects	to	the	growing	political	salience	of	law	and	order,	for	the	crisis	of	trust	and	confidence	
fuels	the	turn	to	punitive	rhetoric	and	policies	as	a	key	political	tactic	to	engage	the	disaffected,	
tap	 public	 anxieties	 and	 shore	 up	 flagging	 legitimacy.	 Political	 disenchantment	 has	 also	
increased	the	attraction	of	third	parties	and	independents,	and	deepened	involvement	in	social	
movement	 politics	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 traditional	 mass	 party	 politics	 (feminism,	










just	 social	 order.	 It	 also	 depends	 on	 deepening	 democratic	 institutions	 and	 practices	 both	 to	
advance	 a	 progressive	 hegemonic	 politics	 and	 to	 defend	 gains	 against	 inevitable	 backlash.	
Unfortunately,	 the	major	democratic	 advances	made	 across	 large	parts	 of	 the	 globe	 since	 the	
1990s	 (in	 Latin	 America,	 Eastern	 Europe,	 South	 Africa	 and	 some	 parts	 of	 South	 East	 Asia)	
appear	 to	be	giving	way	 to	a	 growing	 ‘crisis	of	democracy’	 that	 is	affecting	both	new	and	old	








populist	parties	and	movements	have	recently	grown	 in	size	and	 influence	 in	 the	US	(the	Tea	
Party),	UK	(UKIP),	Australia	(a	variety	have	come	and	gone	since	One	Nation)	and	across	large	
parts	of	Europe,	often	with	street	crime	as	one	symbolic	focus	 linked	to	other	core	obsessions	
with	 immigration,	 xenophobia	 and	 welfare.	 Left	 wing	 populist	 movements	 and	 parties	 (like	
Occupy,	 the	Arab	Spring,	Syriza	 in	Greece	and	 the	 Indignados	and	Podemos	 in	Spain)	are	also	










Although	 there	 is	 diversity	 there	 are	 also	 some	 common	 features.	 There	 is	 firstly	 the	 deeply	
ingrained	distrust	of	the	political	and	corporate	establishment.	Secondly,	there	is	the	return	to	
political	and	popular	visibility	of	questions	of	inequality	and	fairness	that	are	registered	in	other	
developments	 such	 as	 the	 unlikely	 popularity	 of	 French	 economist	 Thomas	 Picketty’s	 (2014)	
socialist	tome,	Capital	in	the	Twenty‐First	Century.	Thirdly,	there	is	a	self‐conscious	refusal	and	
rejection	of	 conventional	 forms	of	 political	 organisation	 and	expression	 (parties,	manifestoes,	
political	 programmes,	 ideology).	 The	 movements	 often	 lack	 any	 clearly	 defined	 political	
purpose,	ideology	or	strategy,	being	more	in	the	nature	of	collective	expressions	of	indignation	




emotional,	 non‐rational,	 politically	 directionless	 (or	 simply	 anti‐political)	 and	 aberrant	
character	of	 this	new	politics.	 (Criminologists	have	done	much	the	same	thing	 in	 their	critical	
accounts	of	penal	populism:	Hogg	2013a).	This	cries	out	for	reassessment,	especially	in	light	of	
the	 alienating	 effects	 of	 the	 managerialism	 that	 dogs	 contemporary	 mainstream	 politics.	 A	
growing	 literature,	 from	 diverse	 disciplines	 and	 standpoints,	 has	 sought	 to	 balance	 the	
traditional	rationalist	bias	of	political	theory	and	discourse	with	a	proper	recognition	of	the	role	



















Populist	 politics	 is	 accused	 of	 offering	 simplistic	 solutions	 to	 complex	 problems.	 However,	 it	
also	increases	access	to	politics	for	those	who	feel	themselves	excluded	or	alienated	from	power	
and	 the	 political	 process.	 At	 its	 core	 it	 contests	 the	 increasingly	 dominant	 idea	 of	 politics	 as	
mere	 administration,	 a	 disenchanted	 realm	 in	 which	 problems	 are	 managed	 and	 interests	
coordinated	 according	 to	 technical	 criteria	 and	 pragmatic	 calculation.	 It	 challenges	 what	
Margaret	Canovan	describes	as	politics	stripped	of	 its	secular	 ‘redemptive’	 face	and	the	moral	
and	 emotional	 appeal	 of	 the	 democratic	 ‘promise	 of	 a	 better	 world	 through	 action	 by	 the	
sovereign	people’	(Canovan	1999:	11).	It	engages	people	outside	the	political	class	and	the	older	
institutionalised	 channels	 of	 communication	 and	 influence.	 It	 cuts	 through	 the	 increasingly	
predictable,	scripted	and	alienating	verbiage	and	rituals	of	contemporary	managerial	politics.	If	
it	 is	 guilty	 of	 offering	 simple	 solutions,	 of	 promising	 more	 than	 it	 can	 deliver	 and	 raising	
expectations	that	are	bound	to	fall	short	of	realisation,	this	merely	confirms	that	populism	is	a	
(usually	 unacknowledged)	 dimension	 of	 democratic	 politics	 in	 general.	 It	 certainly	 does	 not	
justify	 the	 condescending	 dismissals	 so	 familiar	 amongst	 the	 commentariat.	 The	 populist	
promise	that	political	power	might	be	made	transparent	to	the	popular	will:	
	
...	 is	 not	 entirely	 illusory:	 it	 really	 is	 the	 case	 that	 people	 who	 can	 manage	 to	
believe	 in	 the	possibility	of	 collective	action	and	to	unite	behind	 it	can	exercise	
more	 power	 than	 if	 they	 give	 up	 and	 concentrate	 on	 their	 private	 affairs	 …	





importance	of	 reviving	 the	 idea	 that	politics	 is	educative	 rather	 than	merely	 reactive	 to	polls,	
focus	 groups	 and	 rancorous	 media	 campaigns.	 Reviving	 radical	 social	 democracy	 presents	
major	political,	cultural	and	social	challenges.	It	may	not	even	prove	possible	in	today’s	world,	








offering	 itself	 primarily	 as	 a	 theoretical	 critique	 of	 other	 criminologies	 –	 ‘liberal’,	
‘administrative’,	 ‘Left	 idealist’,	 and	 so	 on	 –	 may	 contribute	 something	 to	 critical	 intellectual	
debates	in	criminology	(see	Matthews	2014),	but	it	also	risks	contributing	to	less	healthy	trends	







political	 project.	 Left	 Realism,	 like	 social	 democratic	 renewal	 at	 large,	 should	 eschew	












society’	was	 deeply	 prescient	 (also	 see	 Hall	 1979).	 It	 showed	 that	 far	 from	 being	 a	marginal	
political	 issue,	crime	and	 law	and	order	concerns	were	central	 to	 the	public	experience	of	 the	
British	crisis	in	the	1970s	and	to	the	efforts	of	the	political	Right	to	fashion	a	hegemonic	strategy	
that	 would	 secure	 popular	 consent	 for	 its	 ‘solutions’,	 blending	 neo‐liberalism	 and	
authoritarianism,	a	 ‘free	economy’	enforced	by	a	 ‘strong	state’	(Gamble	1988).	Essential	to	the	
Right’s	success	(and	to	Hall	et	al.’s	1978	analysis,	one	heavily	influenced	by	the	Italian	Marxist,	
Antonio	 Gramsci	 (1971))	 was	 the	 struggle	 at	 the	 level	 of	 everyday	 experience	 and	 common	
sense.	Crime	–	and	certain	crimes	in	particular	(like	‘mugging’)	–	symbolised,	or	were	made	to	
symbolise,	so	much	more	than	mere	violations	of	the	law:	the	impact	of	non‐white	immigration	
on	 the	 transformation	 of	 urban	 neighbourhoods;	 threats	 to	 national	 identity;	 declining	
economic	fortunes;	and	the	failings	of	the	welfare	state.	Crisis	was	thereby	experienced	as,	and	







disproportionate,	 as	 mere	 moral	 panic	 instigated	 by	 the	 media	 or	 cynical	 political	 forces.	 A	
social	democratic	approach	to	crime,	they	argued,	must	take	seriously	the	concerns	of	ordinary	
citizens,	 especially	 those	without	power	and	 influence	or	 the	means	 to	 look	after	 themselves.	
This	was	underscored	by	the	fact	that	everyday	personal	and	household	crime	(assaults,	theft,	
and	so	on)	was	heavily	 concentrated	 in	poor	and	socially	marginal	 communities.	The	unequal	
distribution	of	crime	compounded	all	the	other	forms	of	distress	battled	by	those	at	the	bottom	
of	 the	 social	 heap	 in	 an	 unequal	 society.	 Crime	most	 gravely	 affected	 those	 who	 could	 least	
afford	to	protect	themselves	or	withstand	its	impacts.	Moreover,	tough	political	rhetoric	on	law	
and	order	designed	to	assuage	middle‐class	fears	did	not	translate	into	effective	local	responses	
to	 crime	 for	 those	 most	 affected.	 One	 problem	 was	 that	 the	 unequal	 impacts	 of	 crime	 were	
masked	 in	 official	 statistics	 and	 victim	 surveys	 that	 presented	 a	 general,	 usually	 national,	
picture	 of	 crime	 and	 crime	 trends.	 A	 scaling	 down	 of	 methods	 was	 needed	 to	 capture	 the	
realities	of	crime	at	a	local	level	in	the	most	affected	communities.	This	was	linked	to	demands	
for	 greater	 responsiveness	 and	 accountability	 of	 police	 and	 other	 institutions	 responsible	 for	
managing	local	crime.	
	














badlands	 beyond,	 where	 they	 are	 exposed	 to	 ever	 greater	 crime	 risks	 and	 cycles	 of	
victimised/victimising	behaviour	(Davis	1990;	Genn	1988).	
	
The	 need	 to	 address	 the	 deeply	 unequal	 distribution	 and	 impacts	 of	 crime	 at	 the	 local	 level	
remains	undiminished.	But	the	earlier	focus	of	the	realists	on	responsive	and	accountable	local	
policing	 needs	 to	 be	 pushed	 further	 to	 embrace	 other	 criminal	 justice	 institutions	 (notably	
courts	and	corrections)	and	other	domains	of	public	policy.	Justice	reinvestment	is	one	strategy	
that	 has	 this	 potential:	 to	 simultaneously	 make	 the	 link	 and	 redress	 the	 imbalance	 between	
shrinking	 local	 social	provision	 in	 the	neediest	 communities	 and	 the	churning	of	people	 from	
these	 communities	 through	 an	 expanding	 criminal	 justice	 system	 and	 back	 to	 the	 same	
communities,	 usually	 with	 the	 net	 effect	 that	 local	 social,	 economic	 and	 crime	 problems	 are	
exacerbated	 rather	 than	 ameliorated	 (Allen	 and	 Stern	 2007;	 Bales	 and	 Nagin	 2011;	 Brown,	
Schwartz	and	Boseley	2012).	Justice	reinvestment	(like	most	reform	ideas)	can	be	steered	in	a	
variety	 of	 directions.	 The	 struggle	 to	 frame	 it	within	 a	 social	 democratic	 politics	 is	 therefore	






transnational	 in	nature,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 true	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 some	crimes	 (the	phenomenon	of	
‘mugging’	in	the	1970s	or	even	a	single	local	crime	like	the	1992	abduction	and	murder	of	two‐
year	 old	 Merseysider	 James	 Bulger)	 resonate	 well	 beyond	 any	 particular	 locality,	 inflecting	
public	 fears	 and	 conditioning	 political	 responses.	 More	 fundamentally,	 the	 forces	 that	 shape	
local	crime	problems	are	never	just	local	in	provenance.	Consider	impacts	of	deindustrialisation,	
collapsing	 local	 employment,	 the	 hollowing	 out	 of	 inner	 cities,	 and	 systematic	 home	
foreclosures	that	socially	eviscerated	whole	streets	and	neighbourhoods	in	many	US	cities	in	the	





in	 relation	 to	 crime.	 Although	 there	 is	 nothing	 new	 about	 geo‐political	 divides	 and	 gross	
inequalities	 between	 societies	 of	 the	 global	 North	 and	 global	 South,	 new	 media	 and	
communications	 technologies	 and	 cross‐border	 travel	 and	 mobility	 permits	 as	 it	 motivates	
increasing	numbers	of	people	to	both	think	and	act	globally.	Inequalities	are	driving	behaviour	
in	 novel	ways.	 A	 sense	 of	 relative	 deprivation	 and	 feelings	 of	 humiliation,	 injustice	 or	 indeed	
hope	 for	a	better	 future	 translate	 into	asylum	seekers	 fleeing	armed	conflict	and	persecution,	
economic	 migrants,	 terrorists,	 people	 traffickers,	 drug	 cartels,	 and	 many	 others,	 acting	 to	 a	
degree	 and	 in	 ways	 unknown	 before.	 Poor	 and	 rich	 worlds,	 zones	 of	 chaos	 and	 zones	 of	
prosperity,	are	linked	in	manifold	new	ways.		
	
Crime	 is	 consequently	 also	politicised	 in	 novel	ways.	 It	 is,	 for	 example,	 increasingly	 linked	 to	
questions	of	national	security.	Fear	of	crime	in	local	communities	is,	then,	not	just	a	function	of	
local	crime	but	is	conditioned	by	faraway	events	and	global	anxieties.	Local	and	global	are	newly	
intertwined.	 It	 is	necessary,	 therefore,	 to	set	 the	unequal	and	concentrated	effects	of	 crime	at	
the	local	level	and	within	nations	in	the	context	of	the	gross	inequalities	in	crime	and	violence	








played	 out	 on	 the	 streets	 of	 some	 of	 America’s	 inner	 cities,	 where	 armed	 gangs	 confront	





by	 globalisation	 in	 the	 rich	world	 is	 defensive	 in	 character.	 People	 are	 increasingly	 drawn	 to	
xenophobic	parties	and	movements	that	promise	to	slash	foreign	aid	and	shut	national	borders	
to	 immigrants,	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 other	 unwanted	 intrusions	 from	 the	 outside	 world.	 The	















distinguish	 their	position	 from	the	 ‘broken	windows’	approach	of	US	Right	realists.	The	 latter	
promoted	a	‘zero	tolerance’	approach	not	only	against	street	crime	but	also	minor	disorders	and	
incivilities.	 Their	 argument	 was	 that,	 left	 unchecked,	 such	 disorder	 fuelled	 public	 fears	 and	
community	 deterioration,	 which	 ultimately	 led	 to	 more	 serious	 crime	 (Wilson	 and	 Kelling	
1982).	Left	realist	criticisms	reflected	their	genuine	concern	for	the	civil	liberties	implications	of	
such	an	approach	as	well	as	their	sense	that	it	would	compound	local	alienation	from	the	police,	
inhibit	 cooperation	 and	 reduce	 effectiveness	 in	 addressing	 ‘real’	 crime	problems	 (Kinsey,	 Lea	
and	Young	1986;	 also	see	Matthews	1992).	The	British	Labour	Government	under	Tony	Blair	
was	(once	again)	more	influenced	by	the	Right	realists,	launching	a	controversial	legal	crusade	
against	 anti‐social	 behaviour.	 The	 critical	 responses	 to	 this	 and	 other	 such	 measures	 where	




The	 realities	 are	 that	 street	 disorder	 has	 always	 been,	 and	 remains,	 a	 central	 concern	 of	 the	
police	and	when	considered	in	context	(rather	than	in	terms	of	abstract	legal	categories)	crime	
and	disorder	are	not	always	so	easily	disentangled.	As	well,	in	other	contexts	(like	racial	abuse	
and	 vilification	 or	 sexual	 harassment)	 the	 Left	 generally	 supports	 more	 not	 less	 efforts	 at	
controlling	borderline	illegal	behaviours	that	offend	and	humiliate	and	which	they	often	see	as	
belonging	 on	 a	 continuum	 with,	 or	 symptomatic	 of,	 much	 more	 serious	 problems	 of	
victimisation	 and	 discrimination.	 The	 crucial	 issue	 is	 not	whether,	 but	 how,	 various	 forms	 of	
anti‐social	behaviour	should	be	policed.	The	problem,	at	 least	 in	 the	Australian	context	 (and	 I	
suspect	 elsewhere),	 is	 that	 policing	 public	 order	 has	 so	 often	 involved	 excessive	 and	
discriminatory	 responses,	 like	 arresting	 individuals	 for	 pissing	 in	 laneways	 or	 swearing	 at	
police,	with	 the	disproportionate	burden	 falling	on	young	people,	 the	poor,	 the	homeless	 and	















Right	 who	 attack	 racial	 vilification	 laws	 as	 violations	 of	 free	 speech	 whilst	 showing	 utter	








clearly	 established	 violation	 of	 the	 law.	 Questions	 of	 fairness	 and	 equity	 and	 (dis)respect	 for	
widely	 shared	moral	 and	 social	norms	are	 simply	not	permitted	 to	arise	 in	 these	discussions.	
This	 is	 another	 discursive	 battleground	 on	 which	 Left	 realists	 might	 mount	 campaigns:	 to	










to	 lower	 the	 threshold	 for	 judging	 them	 in	 moral	 and	 social	 terms	 rather	 than	 solely	 by	
reference	 to	 formal	 legal	 criteria:	 in	 short,	 to	 define	 the	 deviancy	 of	 the	 powerful	 up.	 It	 is	
possible.	 In	 Britain	 in	 2012,	 a	 social	 media	 campaign,	 carrying	 the	 tacit	 threat	 of	 boycotts,	
embarrassed	Starbucks	into	voluntarily	paying	additional	tax	to	the	Inland	Revenue	(Ferguson	
2012).	The	difficulty	lies	in	moving	beyond	one‐off	campaigns	such	as	this	to	generalise	moral	
awareness	 and	 engender	 a	 more	 permanent	 shift	 in	 the	 common	 sense	 framing	 and	 public	
control	 and	 accountability	 of	 corporate	 (mis)conduct.	 The	 challenge	 is	 to	 forge	 a	 new	moral	





These	 critiques	 go	 together	 with	 others	 directed	 at	 the	 growing	 role	 of	 risk,	 actuarialism,	
prevention	 and	 security	 in	 criminological	 discourse	 and	 policy	 agendas.	 All	 could	 be	 seen	 as	
symptoms	 of	 an	 increasingly	 dominant	 managerialist	 politics,	 which	 has	 also	 infected	 social	
democracy.	 While	 it	 is	 important	 to	 avoid	 fetishising	 numbers	 (Young	 2011:	 44),	 it	 is	 also	
necessary	 to	recognise	 the	essential	 role	numbers	play	 in	political	and	criminological	debates	
and	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 modern	 government	 (Rose	 1991).	 Statistics	 and	 other	 forms	 of	
quantification	 are	 political	 artefacts,	 but	 they	 are	 no	 less	 significant	 or	 necessary	 for	 that.	 In	
some	 areas,	 the	 problem	 is	 a	 critical	 shortage	 of	 the	 forms	 of	 numericisation	 that	 play	 an	
important	role	in	problematising	particular	issues.	For	many	years,	the	governments	in	the	US‐





denial	 in	 relation	 to	 civilian	 casualties	 by	 simply	 choosing	 not	 to	 know	 (‘We	 don’t	 do	 body	
counts’	 said	 US	 General	 Tommy	 Franks,	 a	 line	 echoed	 by	 government	 officials	 in	 Britain	 and	




Recent	 police	 killings	 of	 Afro‐American	men	 in	 the	 US,	 beginning	with	 the	 shooting	 death	 of	
Michael	Brown,	a	young	Black	man,	in	Ferguson,	Missouri	in	August	2014	have	led	to	riots	and	
prompted	widespread	public	 soul‐searching.	Those	seeking	statistics	on	 the	 incidence	of	such	




time.	 Police	 killings	 are	 a	 symptom	 of	 problems	 that	 run	 deeper	 and	 a	 potential	 trigger	 to	
inquiry	and	reform.	The	Department	of	 Justice	 investigation	prompted	by	Brown’s	killing	and	
the	subsequent	riots	confirmed	the	existence	of	a	general	pattern	of	oppressive,	discriminatory	
treatment	 of	 the	 poor	 and	 minorities	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 local	 criminal	 justice	 system	 in	
Ferguson,	and	by	implication	in	other	inner	city	areas	of	America	with	large	Black	populations	
and	 grave	 levels	 of	 poverty.	 Numbers	 can	 be	 a	 vital	 tool	 in	 making	 the	 hidden	 visible,	 in	
commanding	public	attention	and	in	building	political	pressure	for	change.		
	
In	 2014	 US	 Democratic	 congressman	 John	 Conyers	 introduced	 a	 corporate	 crime	 bill,	 the	
Corporate	Crime	Database	Act,	which	would,	if	enacted,	require	the	US	Department	of	Justice	to	
establish	a	central,	publicly	accessible	database	recording	all	criminal,	civil	and	administrative	
proceedings	 against	 corporations	 in	 the	 US.	 A	 small	 step	 if	 it	 were	 to	 succeed,	 but	 a	 not	






offenders.	 Public	 discourse	 is	 organised	 and	 coheres	 around	 these	 common	 sense	
understandings	and	concerns.		
	
There	 is	 something	 that	 might	 be	 usefully	 called	 a	 ‘crime	 complex’,	 an	 apparatus	 of	
power/knowledge	 in	 Foucault’s	 sense.	 It	 comprises	 the	 core	 enforcement	 and	 knowledge‐
producing	 agencies	 (police,	 courts,	 corrections);	 government	 statistical	 and	 research	 bureaux	
that	 collate	 and	 publish	 crime	 data,	 undertake	 victim	 surveys	 and	 other	 policy‐relevant	
research;	opinion‐shaping	 institutions	and	practices	 (like	media,	polling	organisations,	 and	 so	
on);	and	a	growing	array	of	commercial	industries	with	interests	in	managing	crime	problems	
(insurance,	 private	 security).	 Administrative	 criminology	 and	 the	 many	 tools	 of	 crime	
measurement	 and	 visualisation	 are	 integral	 parts	 of	 the	 ‘crime	 complex’.	 The	 complex	 is	 not	
monolithic	 in	 nature.	 Agencies	 and	 actors	 within	 it	 do	 not	 consciously	 collude	 to	 produce	 a	
uniform	picture.	Rather,	relationships	are	symbiotic.	Institutionalised	interdependencies	tend	to	
ensure,	 for	 example,	 that	 statistics	 of	 recorded	 crime	 (such	 as	 the	 FBI	 Index)	 are	 widely	
reported	by	media,	consumed	by	the	public	and	utilised	by	government.	They	make	it	possible	
to	 speak	credibly	 about	 the	general	 state	of	 crime,	whether	 it	 is	 increasing	or	not,	 and	which	
types	of	crime	in	particular	are	contributing	to	these	trends.	 It	 is	a	sort	of	moral	barometer	of	
the	 state	 of	 the	 nation	 that	 shapes	 public	 attitudes	 and	 guides	 policy.	 Such	 is	 the	 ritualistic	
character	of	such	processes	that	few	are	led	to	ask	how	such	forms	of	knowledge	are	constituted	
and	 what	 they	 include	 and	 exclude.	 The	 effect	 is	 to	 reproduce	 a	 dominant,	 common	 sense	
knowledge	and	understanding	of	the	crime	problem	which	circulates	in	self‐perpetuating,	self‐






crime	 problem	 about	 which	members	 of	 the	 public	 are	 prompted	 to	 express	 their	 fears	 and	
concerns).		
	
The	 striking	 feature	 of	 the	 crime	 complex	 is	 that	 so	 much	 crime,	 and	 certainly	 most	 of	 the	
crimes	and	harms	perpetrated	by	the	powerful	(corporations	and	the	wealthy),	is	systematically	
excluded	 from	it.	Although	not	necessarily	exempt	 from	regulation	 in	some	 form	(usually	of	a	
sparing,	non‐stigmatising	nature),	anyone	wishing	to	produce	a	coherent	picture	(of	incidence,	























than	 trivial	 political	 significance	 because	 common	 sense	 concerning	 crime	 and	 control	 is	







suggested.	 But	 is	 it	mostly	 just	wishful	 thinking?	 In	 these	 times	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 share	 Gramsci’s	
‘pessimism	of	 the	 intellect’	and	not	so	easy	 to	summon	his	 ‘optimism	of	 the	will’.	Yet	political	
renewal	does	depend	upon	just	such	a	recovery	of	hope,	confidence	and	vision.	Some	heart	at	
least	 should	 be	 taken	 from	work	 on	 comparative	 political	 economy	 and	 penal	 policy	 (Lacey	
2008;	Pratt	et	al.	2005)	which	reveals	that	not	all	countries	and	regions	have	been	on	the	same	
political	(and	punitive)	trajectory.	In	particular,	it	tells	a	quite	hopeful,	‘big	picture’	story	about	
crime,	 justice	 and	 social	 democracy	 in	 the	 Nordic	 world	 (Sweden,	 Denmark,	 Norway	 and	
Finland).		
	
The	Nordic	experience	shows	that	 taxing	heavily	 to	 invest	generously	 in	the	education,	health	
and	social	well‐being	of	citizens,	far	from	being	a	drag	on	economic	vitality,	may	support	highly	
productive,	prosperous,	creative,	inclusive	and	safe	societies.	On	all	of	these	criteria,	the	Nordic	
countries	 not	 only	 compete	 with	 but	 also	 significantly	 outperform	 their	 market	 liberal	
counterparts	 in	 the	 Anglo	 world.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 idealise	 these	 societies	 or	 suggest	 they	 are	












that	 is	 (more)	 egalitarian,	 prosperous,	 innovative,	 tolerant	 and	 safe,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	
sparing	in	its	reliance	on	criminalisation	and	penal	repression	(Pratt	and	Eriksson	2013).	They	





Correspondence:	 Professor	 Russell	 Hogg,	 Faculty	 of	 Law,	 School	 of	 Justice,	 Crime	 and	 Justice	
Research	 Centre,	 Queensland	 University	 of	 Technology,	 2	 George	 Street,	 Brisbane	 QLD	 4000,	
Australia.	Email:	russell.hogg@qut.edu.au	
	
	
	
References		
Allen	R	and	Stern	V	(2007)	Justice	Reinvestment:	A	New	Approach	to	Crime	and	Justice.	London:	
International	Centre	for	Prison	Studies.		
Bales	WD	and	Nagin	DS	(eds)	(2011)	Criminology	and	Public	Policy	10(3):	Special	Issue	on	
Justice	Reinvestment.	
Blair	T	(2010)	A	Journey.	London:	Hutchinson.		
Bosworth	M	and	Hoyle	C	(2011)	What	is	criminology?	An	introduction.	In	Bosworth	M	and	
Hoyle	C	(eds)	What	is	Criminology?:	1‐11.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		
Brown	D	(2002)	‘Losing	my	religion’:	Reflections	on	critical	criminology	in	Australia.	In	
Carrington	K	and	Hogg	R	(eds)	Critical	Criminology:	Issues,	Debates,	Challenges:	73‐113.	
Cullompton,	Devon:	Willan.		
Brown	D	(2011)	The	global	financial	crisis:	Neo‐liberalism,	social	democracy	and	criminology.	
In	Bosworth	M	and	Hoyle	C	(eds)	What	is	Criminology?:	76‐94.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press.	
Brown	D,	Schwartz	M	and	Boseley	L	(2012)	The	promise	of	justice	reinvestment.	Alternative	
Law	Journal	37(2):	96‐102.		
Canovan	M	(1999)	Trust	the	people!	Populism	and	the	two	faces	of	democracy.	Political	Studies	
47(1):	2‐16.	DOI:	10.1111/1467‐9248.00184.	
Carlen	P	(2011)	Against	evangelism	in	academic	criminology:	For	criminology	as	an	academic	
art.	In	Bosworth	M	and	Hoyle	C	(eds)	What	is	Criminology?:	95‐108.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press.		
Coggan	P	(2013)	The	Last	Vote:	The	Threats	to	Western	Democracy.	Allen	Lane.		
Croall	H	(2009)	Community	safety	and	economic	crime.	Criminology	and	Criminal	Justice	9(2):	
165‐185.	DOI:	10.1177/1748895809102551.	
Currie	E	(1985)	Confronting	Crime:	An	American	Challenge.	New	York:	Pantheon	Books.		
Currie	E	(2009)	The	Roots	of	Danger:	Violent	Crime	in	Global	Perspective.	Upper	Saddle	River:	
Prentice	Hall.		
Currie	E	(2012)	The	sustaining	society.	In	Carrington	K,	Ball	M,	O’Brien	E	and	Tauri	J	(eds)	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy:	International	Perspectives:	3‐15.	Houndmills:	Palgrave	
Macmillan.	
Russell	Hogg:	Left	Realism	and	Social	Democratic	Renewal	
	
IJCJ&SD								78	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2016	5(3)	
Davis	M	(1992)	City	of	Quartz.	London:	Vintage.		
DeKeseredy	W	and	Schwartz	M	(2010)	Crime,	Law	and	Social	Change	54(2):	Special	issue:	The	
Present	and	Future	of	Left	Realism.		
DeKeseredy	W	and	Schwartz	M	(2012)	Left	realism.	In	DeKeseredy	W	and	Dragiewicz	M	(eds)	
Routledge	Handbook	of	Critical	Criminology:	105‐116.	New	York:	Routledge.		
Dionne	D	(2012)	Our	Divided	Political	Heart:	The	Battle	for	the	American	Idea	in	an	Age	of	
Discontent.	New	York:	Bloomsbury.	
Ferguson	A	(2012)	Starbucks	and	2	Day	FM’s	trial	by	social	media.	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	11	
December:	1.		
Ferguson	C	(2012)	Inside	Job.	Oxford:	Oneworld.	
Gamble	A	(1988)	The	Free	Economy	and	the	Strong	State:	The	Politics	of	Thatcherism.	London:	
Macmillan.		
Genn	H	(1988)	Multiple	victimisation.	In	Maguire	M	and	Pointing	J	(eds)	Victims	of	Crime:	A	New	
Deal?:	90‐100.	Milton	Keynes:	Open	University	Press.	
Gramsci	A	(1971)	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks.	London:	Lawrence	and	Wishart.		
Haidt	J	(2013)	The	Righteous	Mind:	Why	Good	People	Are	Divided	by	Politics	and	Religion.	
London:	Penguin.		
Hall	S	(1979)	Drifting	into	a	Law	and	Order	Society:	Cobden	Trust	Human	Rights	Day	Lecture.	
London:	Cobden	Trust.	
Hall	S,	Critcher	C,	Jefferson	T,	Clarke	J	and	Roberts	B	(1978)	Policing	the	Crisis:	Mugging,	The	
State	and	Law	and	Order,	2nd	edn.	Houndmills:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
Hall	S,	Massey	D	and	Rustin	M	(2013)	After	Neoliberalism:	Analysing	the	present.	In	Hall	S,	
Massey	D	and	Rustin	M	(eds)	After	Neoliberalism:	The	Kilburn	Manifesto:	3‐19.	London:	
Soundings.	
Hay	C	(2007)	Why	We	Hate	Politics.	Cambridge:	Polity.	
Hogg	R	(1988)	Taking	crime	seriously:	Left	realism	and	Australian	criminology.	In	Findlay	M	
and	Hogg	R	(eds)	Understanding	Crime	and	Criminal	Justice:	24‐51.	North	Ryde:	Law	Book	Co.		
Hogg	R	(2013a)	Punishment	and	‘the	people’:	Rescuing	populism	from	its	critics.	In	Carrington	
K,	Ball	M,	O’Brien	E	and	Tauri	J	(eds)	Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy:	International	
Perspectives:	105‐119.	Houndmills:	Palgrave	Macmillan	
Hogg	R	(2013b)	Populism,	law	and	order	and	the	crimes	of	the	1%.	International	Journal	for	
Crime	and	Justice	2(1):	113‐131.	DOI:	10.5204/ijcjsd.v2i1.96.	
Jones	T,	MacLean	B	and	Young	J	(1986)	The	Islington	Crime	Survey.	Aldershot:	Gower.		
Judt	T	(2010)	Ill	Fares	the	Land:	A	Treatise	on	our	Present	Discontents.	London:	Allen	Lane.		
Kampfner	J	(2010)	Freedom	for	Sale:	How	We	Made	Money	and	Lost	Our	Liberty.	London:	Pocket	
Books.		
Kinsey	R,	Lea	J	and	Young	J	(1986)	Losing	the	Fight	against	Crime.	Oxford:	Basil	Blackwell.		
Lacey	N	(2008)	The	Prisoners	Dilemma.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
Laclau	E	(2007)	On	Populist	Reason.	London:	Verso.		
Lea	J	(2002)	Crime	and	Modernity.	London:	Sage.		
Lea	J	and	Young	J	(1984)	What	is	to	be	Done	about	Law	and	Order?	Harmondsworth:	Penguin.		
Lowman	J	and	MacLean	B	(1992)	Realist	Criminology:	Crime	Control	and	Policing	in	the	1990s.	
Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press.		
Marquand	D	(2015)	Mammon’s	Kingdom:	An	Essay	on	Britain,	Now.	London:	Penguin.		
Mason	P	(2013)	Why	it’s	Still	Kicking	Off	Everywhere:	The	New	Global	Revolutions,	2nd	edn.	
London:	Verso.		
Matthews	R	and	Young	J	(1986)	Confronting	Crime.	London:	Sage.		
Russell	Hogg:	Left	Realism	and	Social	Democratic	Renewal	
	
IJCJ&SD								79	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2016	5(3)	
Matthews	R	(1992)	Replacing	‘broken	windows’:	Crime,	incivilities	and	urban	change.	In	
Matthews	R	and	Young	J	(eds)	Issues	in	Realist	Criminology:	19‐50.	London:	Sage.		
Matthews	R	(2014)	Realist	Criminology.	Houndmills:	Palgrave	Macmillan.		
Moisi	D	(2009)	The	Geo‐Politics	of	Emotion:	How	Cultures	of	Fear,	Humiliation	and	Hope	are	
Reshaping	the	World.	London:	The	Bodley	Head.		
Picketty	T	(2014)	Capital	in	the	Twenty	First	Century.	Cambridge:	Belknap	Press.		
Pratt	J	(2006)	Penal	Populism.	London:	Routledge.		
Pratt	J,	Brown	D,	Brown	M,	Hallsworth	S	and	Morrison	W	(2005)	The	New	Punitiveness:	Trends,	
Theories,	Perspectives.	Cullompton:	Willan.	
Pratt	J	and	Eriksson	A	(2013)	Contrasts	in	Punishment:	An	Explanation	of	Anglophone	Excess	and	
Nordic	Exceptionalism.	London:	Routledge.	
Quilter	J	(2014)	Populism	and	criminal	justice	policy:	An	Australian	case	study	of	non‐punitive	
responses	to	alcohol‐related	violence.	Australian	and	New	Zealand	Journal	of	Criminology	
48(1):	24‐52.	DOI:	10.1177/0004865813519656.		
Rose	N	(1991)	Governing	by	numbers:	Figuring	out	democracy.	Accounting,	Organisations	and	
Society.	16(7):	673‐692.	DOI:	10.1016/0361‐3682(91)90019‐B.	
Sutherland	E	(1949)	White	Collar	Crime.	New	York:	Dryden.	
Taylor	I	(1981)	Law	and	Order	Arguments	for	Socialism.	London:	Macmillan.		
The	Economist	Intelligence	Unit	(2013)	Report:	Rebels	without	a	cause	–	What	the	upsurge	in	
protest	movements	means	for	global	politics.	London:	The	Economist	Intelligence	Unit.	
Thompson	E	(1993)	Customs	in	Common.	London:	Penguin.	
Walker	M	(1997)	Clinton:	The	President	They	Deserve.	London:	Vintage.		
Walklate	S	(2015)	Jock	Young,	Left	realism	and	critical	victimology.	Critical	Criminology	23(2):	
179‐190.	DOI:	10.1007/s10612‐015‐9274‐7.	
Wilson	J	and	Kelling	G	(1982)	Broken	windows:	The	police	and	neighbourhood	safety.	Atlantic	
Monthly	(March):	29‐38.	
Young	J	(2007)	The	Vertigo	of	Late	Modernity.	London:	Sage.		
Young	J	(2011)	The	Criminological	Imagination.	Cambridge:	Polity.		
	
	
